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Unresolved issues of behavioral analysis in invertebrates
Commentary on Crump et al on Decapod Sentience
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Abstract: Crump et al. (2022) provide a framework for determining the presence of sentience
in organisms. Their target article is interesting and thought-provoking, but it does not consider
the many unresolved issues related to behavioral analysis – especially when it concerns
invertebrates. We feel that no real progress can be made until such fundamental issues as the
need for a consistent definition of conditioning phenomena, the lack of a generally accepted
behavioral taxonomy, and the use of cognitive terms to explain invertebrate behavior are
examined critically.
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1. Introduction. The target article by Crump et al. (2022) is thought-provoking and timely. We
appreciate the emphasis on invertebrates, particularly decapod crustaceans, in exploring
animal sentience. To one of us (CIA), the target article represents a beautiful demonstration
of the importance of comparative psychology to the analysis of behaviour – especially
learning (Abramson, 2018, 2020). In like vein, it represents to one of us (PC) a call to assess
the ethical significance of pain, and, more generally, of the very idea that some species, but
not others, might be on par with regard to moral standing, provided the non-vertebrate
sentience can be established through comparative studies of behaviour (Allen and Bekoff,
2007). All in all, it is our hope that our commentary serves in part as a foundation for ethical
reasoning about invertebrates in general, informed by comparative psychology (Criscuolo and
Sueur, 2020).
We focus our comments on the material presented in Section 3.5 Criterion 5
[Motivational Tradeoffs], Section 3.6 Criterion 6 [Flexible Self-Protection], and Section 3.7
Criterion 7 [Associative Learning] as they deal specifically with invertebrate learning. Our
intent is to acquaint readers and commentators with the “inconvenient truth” that the field
of invertebrate learning is not all that it appears to be. There are fundamental issues that are
seldom openly discussed. We feel they should be, when considering the learning data used
to support the idea of animal sentience (Abramson, 1994, 1997; Abramson and Wells, 2018;
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Abramson and Levin, 2021), and, by extension, their ethical implications. These issues include
inconsistent definitions, lack of a behavioural taxonomy, and the use of cognitive terms to
describe invertebrate behaviour. Space limitations prevent us from discussing these issues in
detail, so we encourage the readers to consult the citations.
2. Inconsistencies in definitions. There are few universally accepted definitions of learning
phenomena. Major problems are associated with the distinction between instrumental and
operant behaviour and the methods used to study classical conditioning. Here we focus on
the distinction between punishment and avoidance and their underlying mechanisms.
a. Punishment and avoidance. Many researchers fail to distinguish punishment from
avoidance. In punishment training, a response results in the presentation of an aversive
event. In contrast, avoidance training results in the postponement (“Sidman avoidance”) or
omission (“signaled avoidance”) of an aversive event. These are quite different. Punishment
leads to a decrease in behaviour and avoidance leads to an increase in behaviour.
Crump et al. fail to mention anything about the potential underlying mechanisms
governing aversive conditioning in invertebrates according to a behaviorist perspective. The
central question of signaled avoidance (as opposed to punishment) is “How can the absence
of an event be reinforcing?” The answer is that it must be expected (Mowrer, 1951).
Expectation is a cognitive term. However, there are non-cognitive explanations of avoidance.
For the purpose of this commentary, we will tackle the issue from an exclusively behaviorist
perspective. For extensions to the framework of ecological psychology (Lobo et al., 2018), see
Abramson and Calvo (2018).
One of us (CIA) has conducted a series of signaled avoidance experiments on honey
bees (Abramson, 1986), earthworms (Abramson and Buckbee, 1995), and crabs (Abramson et
al., 1988). The experiments showed that the avoidance response was strengthened not by the
omission of an expected aversive event (i.e., by not getting shocked), but only by its
presentation (i.e., by receiving the shock). These results on aversive conditioning open a large
and fundamental question about the learning process in invertebrates. Can the removal of a
stimulus serve as a signal predicting any type of event for an invertebrate?
It is seldom recognized that until the animal responds to the signal, the first few trials
of any avoidance experiment are actually classical conditioning trials in which the signal is
paired with the aversive event. In the two-factor theory of avoidance (Mowrer, 1951), these
early “non-avoidance” trials establish “fear” of the signal. When the animal responds to the
signal, thereby “avoiding” shock, what they are actually doing is escaping “fear”associated
with the cue. This account provides a reasonable and testable non-cognitive explanation.
Experimental designs are available that directly compare classical and avoidance
procedures. We used this approach to look at signaled avoidance in both earthworms
(Abramson and Buckbee, 1995) and crabs (Abramson et al. 1988). We found no differences
between animals who were given the opportunity to avoid the aversive stimulus and those
who were not. Moreover, animals switched from avoidance to classical or from classical to
avoidance showed no disruption in performance relative to control animals that received
either avoidance or classical training throughout. These results and others we have gathered
suggest that invertebrates do not respond to the absence of an event, but to an event that is
presented (Abramson, 1986; Abramson and Wells, 2018).
b. Classical conditioning. Space limitations prevents us from discussing the many
problems associated with the classical conditioning of invertebrates. However, we must note
that the comment of Crump et al. regarding the crab experiments discussed in Criterion 7 is
incorrect. Their comment refers to our learning experiments (Feinman & Abramson 1988) in
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which we classically conditioned crabs by associating vibration with airpuff. Crump et al. state
that we (CIA) “presumed that carapace vibration is neutral.” This is incorrect. We used both
an unpaired control group and a conditioned stimulus (CS) only (i.e., carapace vibration)
control group. The CS-only control group showed no increase in eye blink behaviour over the
course of the experiment whereas there were major differences between the unpaired and
paired animals. If carapace vibration had not been neutral, we would have expected an
increase in CS responses over the course of the experiment and hence we would not have
used carapace vibration as the CS. Moreover, we would have expected the unpaired animals,
too, to increase their responses to the CS as training progressed. The curves associated with
Feinman & Abramson’s Figure 1 (p. 1988) clearly showed that this did not happen. Nothing
was assumed, it was determined experimentally.
Another error can be found on the first line of page 8 in the target article where it is
stated that classical conditioning involves “two stimuli presented simultaneously.” Presenting
both the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli with the same onset and offset does not
produce classical conditioning and we are sure Crump et al. know this. The idea that a
temporal gap is necessary in the formation of associations has been known since the days of
Aristotle and his law of continuity (Brown and Abramson, 2019).
3. Why refer to cognition? Throughout the target article the authors make liberal use of the
term “cognition.” Like so many terms in the social sciences, this term is devoid of any reliable
scientific meaning (Abramson, 2013). There is no consistent definition of cognition.
Moreover, there is no universally accepted criterion to determine whether a behaviour is
“cognitive.” The problems with the term should be acknowledged. Overskeid (2008) discusses
other problems of cognitivism arising from its neglect of the functional analysis of behaviour.
The terms “behaviour” and “intelligence” are also fraught with difficulties (Abramson
and Place, 2005; Cvrčková, Žárský, and Markos, 2016). Biologists do not agree on what
constitutes behaviour. Levitis et al. (2009) found 25 different definitions of behaviour.
Regarding the term “intelligence” there are over 70 distinct definitions (Legg & Hutter, 2007).
How can anyone accurately study or compare the intelligence of animals, “brainless systems”
or machines, if one has no consistent definition of what it is?
4. Behavioural taxonomies. Another issue hindering the study of invertebrate learning is the
lack of a universally accepted behavioural taxonomy. Tulving (1985) identifies the ways a
taxonomy can advance the field. One of the most important is that it allows social scientists
to speak “the same language.”
5. Conclusion. The target article’s arguments are sound and thought provoking. The use of
the comparative perspective to create a testable criterion for sentience can be expected to
stimulate much research, but the foundation for criteria 5, 6, and 7 will need some
reinforcement.
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